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I.  Introduction 
Professional services require certain organizational patterns in order to avoid information 
asymmetries and external effects. These same patterns are used within production structures 
involving various degrees of monopoly. However, competitive restraints are justified today only 
when substantial external effects are clearly present, whereas information asymmetries hardly 
justify such restraints because reputational investments have become widespread in the economy 
and are relatively efficient in overcoming such asymmetries. As a consequence, innovation in the 
production of externalities can make competitive constraints unnecessary.  
The rest of this work is divided in two parts. The first one discusses the problems of 
professions generally and the second focuses on two specific cases. Thus, section 2 identifies the 
characteristic situation of professional services, which is caused by the presence of information 
asymmetries when private services are offered, the presence of, or desire for, external effects and 
the reduction in costs that arises when the same professional provides both types of service. 
Section 3 argues that in order to resolve the problems of information asymmetry, it is usually 
necessary to adopt a series of organizational patterns: deferred and variable compensation in line 
with the professional’s and others’ conduct, and self-selection of professionals having ideal 
characteristics. Section 4 outlines a scheme for assessing the situation of professions from the 
point of view of economic policy.  
The second part encompasses sections 5 and 6, which analyze the situation of two 
professions—pharmacies and conveyancers—, which are now the most highly regulated in 
Europe, perhaps because they are also the oldest (Monti, 2003, 2). A similar conclusion is 
reached in both cases, namely, that historical justification for a corporatist organization of these 
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services is no longer valid and that, as a consequence, both professions now offer inappropriate 
services for the current situation of demand and technology. Liberalization is therefore advisable, 
especially for the most standard services. 
II.  Nature of professional services 
Professional services have two properties: information asymmetry between providers and 
customers and the production of external effects. Many other goods and services share these two 
properties but their extent in professional services leads to special problems which can only be 
resolved by adopting special organizational formulas. 
II.1.  Information asymmetry 
Production of professional services suffers from serious information asymmetries for two 
reasons. Firstly, such services often involve application of the professional’s human capital in 
order to judge individual cases. Secondly, results are extremely difficult to assess. Professional 
work can therefore be seen as the application of specialized human capital to the solution of 
individual cases, leading to a product that is difficult to evaluate. Each of these elements—
assessment, a personalized product that is difficult to observe and intense human capital—
involve specific contractual problems. The fact that they come together compounds the 
difficulties which characterize professional services. 
Moreover, transactions are often non-repetitive and atypical. Many professional services 
present “search” attributes, the quality of which might be known prior to purchase or 
consumption, as well as “experience” attributes, whose quality can only be appreciated during or 
after consumption, as with many other services (Nelson, 1970). In addition, the most outstanding 
characteristic is the presence of “credence” attributes, whose quality can never be fully 
appreciated (Darby and Karni, 1973).  
Other complications relate to the heterogeneity of demand, the high degree of specific 
human capital, and the presence of professional judgment. 
a)  Heterogeneous demand. Professional services are individual to the extent that each 
customer demands and receives different services. Even when cases share certain 
elements, these usually appear in different combinations, so that service standardization is 
often impossible or at least unadvisable. Although to some extent the development of 
routines and protocols assists in standardization, this is often a source of problems as it 
affects quality as perceived by the customer.2 Control can only exist in the form of 
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evaluation of the productive process rather than of its results, using implicit motivation 
mechanisms through moral indoctrination, quasi-rents and self-selection.  
b)  Specific human capital. Essentially, professionals have to invest now in knowledge needed 
to resolve problems in the future. As a result, their decisions must not be seen as if they 
were just supplying labor, in the neoclassical sense. They have to be seen instead as 
investors. Furthermore, not only is compensation deferred but also investments are specific 
because professional knowledge has practically no value outside the profession. As a 
result, expected returns and the risk of expropriation play important roles in the long term 
and must be taken into account when professional activities are regulated or managed. 
c)  Professional judgment. An essential part of professional work involves judging individual 
cases, often urgently, and using information which is imperfect but can be improved at an 
additional cost in time and money. This judgement is mostly individual, with each 
professional taking decisions alone. Even when the production processes of many 
professional services involve teams in which there is a degree of mutual control, a large 
degree of individual discretion is applied. 
All these circumstances create a situation in which there are substantial information 
asymmetries amongst those providing, organizing, regulating and using professional services, 
making it very difficult to contain conflicts of interest among them. For example, it is difficult 
for professionals to guarantee the optimal level of quality. When a professional does not provide 
optimal quality, she will obtain a short-term gain in exchange for an uncertain possibility of a 
future sanction. Supervision of service quality is difficult for other participants, whether they are 
customers, regulators, professional associations or other professionals, even within a single firm. 
Any subsequent review of quality will be, for instance, subject to the typical problem involved in 
assessing decisions taken in a context of uncertainty and imperfect information. The decision 
being assessed might have been right with the information available, although information 
gathered subsequently shows that it was wrong under the actual circumstances. (There is, as a 
consequence, a substantial risk of falling into the traps of hindsight bias3). A main problem of 
this type of service is therefore that of creating mechanisms for safeguarding or ensuring quality 
under unfavorable circumstances because verification of contractual performance by third parties 
and even by the interested parties themselves is often only possible in the long term. 
II.2.  External effects 
So far we have considered the problem of the information asymmetry that exists between the 
suppliers and customers of private services. This is a typical bilateral agency relationship in 
which the supplier acts as agent for a principal who is the customer. In fact, however, it is more 
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complex than this. Not only because there are usually other individuals involved, such as 
partners, regulators, informers, assessors, etc., reducing the bilateral nature of the transaction, but 
also because the provision of private services usually goes together with external effects or, in 
other words, with the provision of public services. Hence, the relationship becomes a multilateral 
one, involving greater complexity and potential for conflict. 
These externalities stem from both the nature of the private services and from political 
decisions which oblige certain private service providers to also provide certain public services. 
The underlying economic rationale is the same in both cases—the production of private and 
public services by a single professional implies economies of scope or joint production. In other 
words, it is less costly if a single professional produces both private and public services on the 
same cases. The reason lies in the use of joint informational and contractual resources. On the 
one hand, the provision of private and public services usually requires the same information, 
both general—the human capital or general knowledge to be applied—and specific—relating to 
the customer or the case in question. On the other, similar problems arise with both types of 
service regarding contractual safeguards. It is necessary and costly to ensure that the professional 
fulfils the contract. Such problems require the use of safeguard mechanisms which, being costly, 
should be used to ensure fulfillment over the widest possible range of services. 
Professional services result in a wide variety of external effects with an element of so-called 
“gatekeeping”. This gatekeeping entails authorizing a third party—the gatekeeper, who has other 
functions, in this case the provision of private services, so is free to refuse to cooperate and, by 
doing so, will prevent or curb unlawful conduct.4 The concept is a broad and imprecise one. For 
Kraakman, examples of gatekeepers include accountants and lawyers in securities transactions, 
doctors, pharmacists, employers’ vicarious liability, bouncers, sellers of firearms, advertising 
agencies, insurance companies in environment regulation, common law duties of lenders and 
corporate directors, tax preparers and practitioners, and chaperones. Most lawyers, including 
civil law notaries, carry out a dual role which involves not only the provision of private services 
but also acting as gatekeepers in this sense. English barristers, for example, act as agents for the 
courts.5 Gatekeeping is not the only type of external effect, however. For example, litigation 
lawyers contribute substantially to judicial rulings and the quality of their services is therefore 
important in the creation of case law. 
Assigning the production of externalities to professionals reaches economies of scope but 
poses a serious problem in that, in principle, the professional has no incentives to produce the 
externalities, as these are services for which she is not paid and for which she might even have to 
incur a certain cost. As a gatekeeper, the professional is an agent for two principals (her 
customer and society) whose interests are often in conflict. In order to resolve this satisfactorily, 
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there must be strong incentives to make the professional independent from the customer who is 
paying her even considering that, if the services are refused, she risks losing the customer. 
Achieving sufficient incentives for such a high degree of independence will be costly. In 
particular, it will require suppressing or restraining competition. The efficiency and cost of 
standard organizational patterns, as described in the next section, must be evaluated in this 
context. 
III. Organizational patterns  
Because of the characteristics analyzed in the previous section, professional services have to 
be produced and sold within organizational formulas—such as professional associations, 
professional firms or hybrids, such as health maintenance organizations—which are quite 
different from those of neoclassical abstractions of firms and markets. In addition, these formulas 
are similar in liberal professions and professional firms, another reason why competition policy 
should focus more on professional firms than on traditional professions. 
III.1. Common patterns 
The common organizational structure for all professional activities, whether in competition 
or not, is characterized by incentives for the professionals themselves and by the process of self-
selection which such incentives generate. Three basic features are present: (a) a deferred 
compensation system, with high penalties in case of non-compliance with professional standards; 
(b) variability in earnings, promoting productivity and mutual control; and (c) a process of self-
selection introducing a certain degree of automatic control.  
a)  Quasi-rents. Professionals are paid above their highest opportunity earnings during the 
most important stage of their career, with the professional or the firm receiving a quality 
premium or “quasi-rent”,6 which compensates for prior investments. This type of 
compensation motivates individual professionals and firms to comply, provided there is a 
positive probability of losing the quasi-rents in case of non-compliance. In the absence of 
competition, such quasi-rents are structured in the form of professional entry barriers—
entry examinations, hierarchies, and apprenticeships—which require a large initial 
investment. On the other hand, in firms that compete with others in providing professional 
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services—as in consulting, auditing, law, investment banking or, even, higher 
education7—these quasi-rents result from organizational decisions on personnel selection, 
task allocation, promotions and compensation profiles.8 In both cases, however, 
compensation is below opportunity earnings during the initial period and above it 
afterwards. 
b)  Variable compensation. The fact that earnings vary positively with the professional’s 
conduct in aspects in which competition is accepted and negatively with the conduct of 
colleagues in areas in which it is prohibited (basically with their bad conduct) favors the 
achievement of some efficiency objectives in two ways. Firstly, it promotes productivity in 
areas in which there is competition. Secondly, it encourages mutual control so that 
competition is restricted to such areas.  
c)  Self-selection. Finally, the presence of such incentives usually leads to a process of self-
selection of a certain type of person, those who appreciate working under such restrictions 
and with such payment patterns. Mainly, deferred compensation encourages entry by 
people having a low subjective discount rate. To the extent that preferences differ amongst 
individuals and are constant throughout their lives, this self-selection favors the entry of 
professionals having preferences that are well suited for rejecting temptations of bad 
professional practice, which often bring benefits in the short term only, with possible 
penalties being paid only in the future. 
Revealingly, the structure of such incentives is similar, whether they result from an internal 
decision by organizations which compete freely in the provision of professional services 
(auditing, consultancy, law firms) or from the competitive constraints faced by liberal 
professionals practicing independently as individuals. When competing firms provide the 
services, such incentive patterns are not seen as restrictions to competition but as professional 
“careers” in a sort of internal labor market. In many cases this distinction is more legal than 
economic, as with the treatment of vertical restrictions when the distinction depends on whether 
distributors are vertically integrated with the producer or not.  
In practice, however, there is more often a radical difference. While producers and 
distributors of non-professional goods usually compete with other producers and distributors—
this being a necessary condition if the vertical restrictions are to be considered favorably—, 
professional associations almost always act as monopolies. Economic justification for the 
restrictions in the latter case therefore requires two additional conditions. First, the existence of 
substantial external effects as produced by the incentive structure created by the restrictions, 
because the problems of information asymmetry can be resolved using contractual safeguards 
that are freely drawn up by competing private organizations.9 Second, it must be less efficient to 
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produce such external effects under an alternative regime of regulated competition between firms 
whose employees and partners are motivated according to the standard professional patterns.10 
This might be the case when such a regime requires a high degree of supervision and regulation, 
and public administrations are not capable of providing it efficiently.  
III.2. The power of competition between professional firms 
Much of the discussion on professional regulation would be more relevant for policymaking 
in the 19
th than in the 21
st century because it ignores the fact that professional services are, or (in 
the absence of competitive restraints) would be, provided through professional firms. The 
presence of professional firms redefines the problems, provides effective solutions and requires a 
broader regulatory perspective for professional services.  
Firstly, professional firms are better able to safeguard their transactions with reputation, 
repetition and a longer horizon. Secondly, agency problems between the firm and both its 
professionals and its customers become the key issue.11 Thirdly, the presence of firms combines 
the issue of professionals’ regulation with the more basic matter of freedom of contract.  
This last point requires a short digression.  
The commonality of organizational patterns within traditional liberal professions and 
professional firms freely competing in the market also holds an important lesson for competition 
policy in this field. One of the main problems of self-regulation amongst professionals is that 
there is no competition between self-regulatory structures, as each profession enjoys a monopoly 
over a certain market. The use of organizational devices to avoid information asymmetries and 
control quality indicates that professional firms are also self-regulatory structures and thus, when 
competing with each other, they in fact create competition between regulatory frameworks. 
The legal environment does not always help firms to solve the agency problems, mainly 
because during the 20
th century judges have been increasingly allowed to regulate contracts 
(Arruñada and Andonova, 2004), impeding the development of private legal orders by firms. 
Without this constraint, professional firms would work more as private and competitive 
jurisdictions, providing the most viable form of competitive self-regulation, with each firm 
acting as its own self-regulator each time it changes its internal rules or its product guarantees. 
For example, if competitive firm A provides a service to client B, in order to motivate itself and 
to control its professionals, the firm could promise full satisfaction or the money back. 
                                                                                                                                                               
patients and insurance companies which have led to this sector being considered as full of 
“market faults”. See Feldstein (1988, 314-38) for an introduction. 
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Depending on the legal system, the mechanism may be allowed to function under second party 
enforcement or may be mandatorily supervised by the courts. This defines two situations for 
cases in which a customer B claims to be unsatisfied and provider A rejects the claim because he 
thinks B is abusing the guarantee and acting opportunistically. If the case is subject to a court 
decision (mandatory third party enforcement) and the judge rules for B, this may hinder the 
development of private legal orders, in which firms would act as judges, controlled by reputation 
and competition. The tendency of judges to intervene in all areas irrespective of the contractual 
assignment of decision rights (in which A is granted the right to freely decide on the merits of 
B’s claim) thwarts competition between private legal orders which could otherwise provide the 
most effective solutions for such difficult relationships. In sum, the main issue is to what degree 
firms should be allowed to act as judges within relational contracting structures, and how this 
competition among contractual frameworks could be made easier, or at least not be hampered, by 
legal institutions.12 
IV. Assessment of competitive restraints in the professions 
The use of similar organizational patterns by firms providing professional services in 
competitive markets, by professional associations and even by some civil service systems 
indicates that such patterns are likely to be efficient or at least, to some degree, adaptive. It also 
justifies a case-by-case analysis of the possible benefits and monopoly costs present in the 
various types of institution and market structures in the professional service sector. Such an 
analysis must be based on its own merits, like the type of analysis which is increasingly being 
carried out on the vertical restrictions between producer and distributor. For vertical restrictions, 
both the economic literature and, increasingly, anti-trust authorities prefer to study each case 
separately, applying a rule of reason and rejecting rigid, per se exclusion of certain general 
patterns, such as territorial exclusiveness. In professions, it is also best to adopt a case-by-case 
approach, analyzing each profession separately. A study of each of these institutions must take 
into account the possible existence of external effects and the cost of alternatives for dealing 
with them; also, problems of information asymmetry, considering how they can be mitigated or 
resolved both now and in the future within the new framework being considered. In other words, 
on the one hand policy-makers have to define which services they want professionals to produce 
and which they want regulators and civil servants to produce. On the other, they have to consider 
achieving a transition that will avoid unintentionally increasing entry barriers and creating 
uncontrolled regulatory bodies, while encouraging the development of spontaneous, contractual 
safeguards for problems of information asymmetry.  
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Ideally, economic policy should not only examine the situation in the appropriate 
professional sector but should also compare its efficiency with alternative formulas. Both tasks 
are difficult, however, as shown by the following analysis.  
IV.1. A check-list for analyzing a profession 
Analysis of regulation of a specific profession should include at least a thorough review of 
the objectives of the profession regarding information asymmetry and external effects, its real 
efficiency in achieving such objectives and the cost of achieving them. 
Efficient analysis of the attributes or nature of the service requires an understanding of the 
productive and contractual technology involved. Initially, the attributes of information 
asymmetry and quality in the professional field might be considered of secondary importance 
today to external effects, because modern markets have been shown to have greater capacity than 
the State for resolving problems of information asymmetry, partly because of durable firms with 
considerable reputational investments. In other words, restricting competition within a profession 
makes more sense to the extent that the profession provides public services involving external 
effects. The possible costs of such patterns caused by the restriction of competition may be 
negligible in comparison with the greater costs that would be generated if such services were 
provided by civil servants or even by professional firms in a highly regulated environment. 
Secondly, study of the efficiency with which the service is provided within a real or 
hypothetical organizational formula will generally focus on the incentives created by the 
collection of quasi-rents through deferred payment and rents, variability of earnings and the 
consequent processes of self-selection. In this set-up, it is especially important to assess whether 
the sanctioning mechanisms needed to make quasi-rent incentives really effective actually work; 
whether variability of earnings is sufficient to promote cost reduction and mutual quality control; 
and whether the process of self-selection favors the entry of the type of personnel most suitable 
for the functions in question and for the development of corporate control patterns. 
Finally, the costs generated by competitive restrictions must be considered. This assessment 
must include the loss of welfare caused by the higher prices and the resulting lower quantities; 
the increase in costs caused by competitive restrictions, which becomes more marked when 
innovation is restricted and, finally, rent seeking costs which largely depend on how the entry 
mechanism is designed. Of fundamental importance are indications on effective elasticity of 
demand, which will be low when there are legal restrictions making consumption compulsory; 
the rate of return on the whole professional career, with the data on annual earnings being of 
little consequence; and the design of mechanisms for taking decisions on price-fixing and entry 
controls. It is also important to determine to what extent the regulator is ‘captured’, whether 
there is sufficient separation between regulators and regulated and whether citizens are correctly 
informed.13 Finally, it is important to analyze entry mechanisms and the costs of rent seeking, at 
both the entry and rent distribution stages. 
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IV.2. Comparing organizational possibilities 
It is difficult to compare possible solutions because there are certain aspects about which 
little is known. Three main problems are: too narrow a focus on one of the dimensions of 
competition, with price fixing or freedom of entry often being considered the only relevant 
competitive variable; the invisibility of solutions that have not surfaced because they require 
technological innovations that are inaccessible within the current corporative structures; and the 
need to reach a certain equilibrium between the risks of regulatory capture and regulatory 
opportunism. 
Emphasis on one dimension of competition 
Many deregulating proposals do not attempt to understand the nature of the services and just 
focus on one of the variables that may be useful in institutional design—either the intensity of 
price competition or freedom of entry. A focus on price competition often disregards its 
implications for the nature of the service that can be produced in a specific institutional order and 
the concentration process that is often generated. Similarly, freeing entry under fixed prices (as 
sometimes occurs and has often been proposed for pharmacies) disregards substantial costs (such 
as those related to dissipation of rents used to keep marginal pharmacies open and thus fully 
cover a given territory). 
However, legislators may change not only the intensity of competition but also its 
dimensions, as well as product definition and the degree of integration. Explicit consideration 
should be given to these possibilities in order to avoid the risk of adopting adventurous reforms 
which may have doubtful results and may end up in situations that are regulated in an even more 
deficient way.14Otherwise, the exclusion of external effects from the professional’s task usually 
means that production or control has to be carried out by new regulations and regulators whose 
organization is by no means totally efficient. The costs of these new regulations are usually 
under-estimated, despite the tendency of deregulation measures to quickly end up as just a 
different way of regulating an economic sector. 
Dynamic analysis: the relativity of technological determinants 
The discussion so far has assumed a given technology and has analyzed the influences it 
creates. But technology in any industry changes as a consequence of innovation. In this dynamic 
context, the technological restrictions analyzed in the second section should be partially seen as 
the result and not only the cause of the competitive restrictions present in markets for 
professional services. It is no coincidence that typical restrictions in professional sectors remove 
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incentives for innovation (Arruñada, 1992), in order to protect professionals’ quasi-rents and to 
recover investments in human capital. These systems involve a certain cost in terms of slow, 
limited innovation.  
This lack of innovation can be expected to vary greatly from activity to activity and the 
technological gap with the rest of the economy to widen as external innovation increases. There 
are clear signs that this may be a problem, with potential technology being applied slowly due to 
the organization of some professional sectors. And this is applicable to both production and 
contractual technologies. In the case of medicine, for example, an increasing number of 
therapeutic and diagnostic techniques now require knowledge that is not strictly medical but 
doctors are still required for using them.  
This is also true for contractual technologies because, as argued above, greater development 
of brands and commercial names makes it possible for free action in the market to resolve the 
problems of information asymmetry between the professional and the customer. The justification 
for competitive restrictions based on information asymmetry was clearer in the past, when the 
participants in commercial transactions were mostly individuals.15 In many new sectors, the free 
market has now shown its capacity for resolving more serious information asymmetries than 
those existing in many sectors that were traditionally professional.16 For example, compare the 
design, production and sale of automobiles and buildings.  
Consequently, there seems to be a substantial degree of inertia in the assignation of 
competitive or corporate organizational patterns to different sectors depending on their situation 
in the past. In many cases, corporate patterns seem to be little more than a historical remnant for 
which there is little justification today. The cognitive problem in such cases, however, is 
complex. Although, ideally, public policy should apply reforms allowing for the evolution of 
corporate sectors in line with new possibilities for market operation which have opened up but 
are mostly unknown, such reforms run the risk of destroying the efficiency of the traditional 
system. The transition therefore becomes risky and may even cause a reaction towards new 
restraints on competition. 
The need for balance between regulatory capture and opportunism 
In any of the organizational possibilities—from the regulation of private suppliers to 
management by civil servants—preserving the long-term incentives which are characteristic of 
professional services requires balancing two opposing dangers—opportunism by regulators (or 
managers) against professionals, and the capture of regulators by professionals.  
a)  Opportunism takes the form of imprudent or self-interested regulatory or managerial 
changes which, by bringing down prices, freeing entry, changing operating methods, 
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are repeated purchasers and public bodies. 
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skipping promotions, reducing salaries, forcing early retirement, and so on, may 
expropriate earnings above what is obtainable outside the profession or the firm (the 
“quasi-rents” which compensate for investments made in the past). The risk is especially 
great when there is poor knowledge about the nature of the quasi-rents, which are often 
seen, especially by the general public, as a surplus salary or pure rent when they might be 
a return on a prior investment in human capital. Furthermore, expropriatory decisions can 
result from the shortsighted horizon of regulators and managers, inclining them to destroy 
the system of deferred payment, altering or introducing uncertainty into expectations of 
future remuneration and removing incentives for future investments, even when such a 
system is efficient. 
b)  There may also be capture of regulators and managers by professionals. This phenomenon 
may result in price rises or freezing of the supply with the resulting generation of rents or 
distribution amongst a smaller number of senior professionals. Wealth is thus transferred 
from customers and junior professionals to all or the most senior professionals, output 
falls, and possible candidates waste more resources in their attempts to enter the 
profession.  
It is difficult to find a perfect solution to these problems because, while the introduction of 
greater self-regulation protects professionals’ investments, it causes a greater risk of regulatory 
capture. However, it is important to provide guarantees that deferred compensation will be 
received in the future. Note that professional firms display several features that act as safeguards 
when using systems of this type. For instance, the recipients of quasi-rents are also the main 
decision-makers, as the longest-serving professionals are often partners in their firms. In the 
public area, we should therefore learn to consider this positive aspect of self-regulation, 
accepting some degree of regulatory capture to safeguard specific investments in human capital. 
IV.3. International comparisons  
A final word of caution is in order regarding the use of international comparisons, because of 
the interconnections between services provided by professionals and other institutions in the 
public sector.17 Professionals in different countries may be providing different services which 
require different organizational structures—that is, different competitive restraints.18 Evidence 
on differential regulation would therefore support a private interest explanation only if such 
differences in regulation are shown to be inconsistent with the different services being provided. 
Sections 5 and 6 analyze now the case of pharmacies and conveyancers.  
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V. Pharmacies 
Like many other human activities, health care has undergone gradual specialization. A single 
individual, who often also acted as priest, once cared for the sick. Over the centuries, a range of 
specialists grew up—doctors, pharmacists, producers of medicines, nurses. Pharmaceutical 
service underwent two basic transformations. The first, when medical care was separated from 
the production of medicines, took place in ancient Egypt but the second, when the production of 
medicines was separated from distribution, only took place after the First World War.19 
This historical sequence suggests that the survival of a profession devoted to dispensing 
might well be an anomaly. Perhaps what was regulated at the time was not so much the activity 
of distribution as that of production by pharmacies. Yet medicines are no longer produced by 
hand in pharmacies but industrially in factories and laboratories, in processes also subject to 
substantial regulation. Medicines on sale also need to be safe and effective, but the role of 
pharmacies is now insignificant in this area as they only prepare a small number of prescribed 
formulae. For most medicines, control is achieved by industrial production, with the incentives 
provided by manufacturers’ reputations, and regulation which includes the authorization of new 
medicines. 
All the same, in most developed countries, pharmacies have retained a professional status, 
with entry barriers and organizational controls that depart substantially from a free market 
regime. Justification of this professional status is usually based on three types of objective: (1) 
use of the right medicines in each individual case; (2) availability of the necessary medicines; (3) 
gatekeeping, either in the control of certain drugs or, more recently, some type of economic 
optimization. With the exception of use, the other objectives (and also use in the case of 
antibiotics) are associated to externalities. Let us briefly examine these objectives to see to what 
extent they have are justified in today’s economy.  
V.1.  Services 
Health advice 
In their traditional form, pharmacies have always supplied customers with a wide range of 
information, including the diagnosis of minor complaints that can be treated with over-the-
counter medicines, and advice on the proper dosage and use of medicines. Obviously, the quality 
of these information services is of vital importance and users find it difficult to evaluate such 
quality. Furthermore, it is widely believed that the increasing strength, variety and cost of 
medicines has made proper selection and control more important. 
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However, it is unclear whether the dual control of prescriptions by both doctors and 
pharmacies is really efficient and, if not, who should carry out this control. Furthermore, even if 
this doubt were resolved in favor of pharmacists, it would still be necessary to determine what 
type of pharmacy would be required to provide such advisory services and how they should be 
provided. It is possible that pharmacies as we know them today are no longer necessary and that 
the production of information should be carried out separately from the physical distribution of 
medicines. This debate on the design of pharmacies links up with the possibilities of providing 
pharmaceutical services via the Internet, which would dilute the importance of the economies of 
scope that perhaps still exist amongst the logistical and advisory functions of conventional “brick 
and mortar” pharmacies. 
In addition, health care experts insist that modern pharmacies should have more human and 
physical resources than is often the case. Examples of such resources are the constant presence 
of at least one qualified pharmacist, users’ clinical data bases integrated with those of the rest of 
the health system, and enough space to guarantee confidentiality for users. In many European 
countries, traditional pharmacies find it difficult to meet these requirements because regulations 
impede them from reaching economies of scale.  
Availability 
Most countries have given priority to nationwide provision of pharmaceutical services. They 
have therefore regulated the opening of new pharmacies and have manipulated prices and 
margins in order to guarantee profitability and therefore survival for even the most remote 
pharmacies. This has led to serious imbalances because there has been no adaptation to changes 
in demand and in technology, caused by urbanization and new means of transportation. 
As a result of such changes and of the difficulties of regulation, in most of Europe 
pharmacies are often too small and their density is excessive. Furthermore, this fragmentation of 
pharmacies disregards the fact that the lower costs of public transport have drastically altered the 
size of the relevant markets. If it is efficient for many rural users to travel 40 or 60 km to receive 
primary health care, it is difficult to understand why the organization and the cost of a 
pharmaceutical distribution system should be manipulated so that the same rural (and, 
increasingly, old town) consumers have access to a pharmacy near their home.  
The way in which distribution is carried out for unregulated and widely consumed products 
provides a useful empirical comparison, of special interest for showing the opportunities which 
are missed by the current system. All over Europe, small towns are visited⎯on at least a weekly 
basis⎯by distributors of fruit, meat, frozen goods, fresh bread and other foods who, having 
invested in suitable vehicles, make a living from running such mobile shops. Such traveling 
services would not be sufficient to meet urgent needs but would at least meet the demand of 
those towns which today have no pharmaceutical service at all, let alone an emergency service. 
Territorial coverage, if necessary, could therefore be achieved by using a number of methods, 
such as mobile sales points, mail orders, the Internet and setting up dispensaries, and not 
necessarily by keeping small pharmacies open. Such methods would serve not only rural users 
but all people who are unable to travel, and would do so without sacrificing any possible 
gatekeeping.  15 
Physical pharmaceutical distribution is a necessary condition for obtaining access to 
medicines. It is therefore logical for such distributors to carry out certain public gatekeeping 
functions to ensure that access complies with the law. In particular, pharmacies have 
traditionally been assigned the task of controlling access to dual-purpose substances, such as 
narcotics and stimulants, which can be used not only as medicines but also for other purposes 
that are considered improper.  
In a similar way, pharmacies can be used to contain the moral hazard inherent in controlling 
pharmaceutical expenditure by carrying out financial control of prescriptions, either by 
dispensing substitutes for costly prescriptions or forcing doctors to prescribe generics. The aim is 
that only the drugs that are necessary should be consumed for each complaint, avoiding the 
tendency to consume unnecessarily costly medicines, specially when a third party pays the bill, 
or ones that might generate negative externalities, such as the use of too powerful antibiotics.  
V.2.  Policy 
This analysis of the nature and evolution of pharmaceutical retailing leads to conclude that 
there are two relevant aspects—private and public. With private services, the essential element is 
the substitution that has taken place throughout the 20
th century regarding quality guarantees. 
Professional safeguarding of quality has become less important with the development of 
industrial drugs and wider access to medical prescription. With regard to public services, modern 
methods of communication have made the need for physical presence unnecessary in achieving 
territorial coverage.  
The current structure of the sector is, therefore, defective in many European countries 
because it still aims to avoid private information asymmetries and to guarantee territorial 
coverage, leading to inefficient fragmentation. If there is any justification for restricting 
competition, it should be based on the objective of achieving public services associated with the 
sequential control of health activity, especially perhaps from en economic point of view. 
To avoid the inefficiencies seen in the sector today and to promote the public service 
objectives, it would be necessary to renovate the regulations, which should aim to promote larger 
pharmacies and allow the use of distance-service technologies, both by mail and online. With 
respect to control and gatekeeping functions, there is no apparent reason why the control exerted 
by a distance or online pharmacy should be less effective than that performed by a conventional 
pharmacy. On the one hand, the larger size of the former makes them easier to supervise and 
gives them a greater incentive to comply with the law. On the other hand, control of both the 
doctor giving the prescription and the purchaser could be more effective than in conventional 
pharmacies in which, for example, purchases are often made on behalf of the patient. In addition, 
computerization of prescriptions would reduce the current risk of forgeries. 
A case in point is that of the European policy on online pharmacies.20 The European 
Commission and most governments declare that they are committed to promoting innovation in 
this field but they do not adopt effective measures. On the contrary, concern over consumer 
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safety is used as the argument against liberalization of online sales of medicines. Meanwhile, 
sales by rogue sites keep increasing, given the difficulties for effective enforcement. The end 
result is that prohibition hinders the existence of reliable online operations and not only protects 
conventional pharmacies but also, indirectly, rogue sites, as an increasing number of customers 
use them to buy legal medicines that could be provided by reliable online operators. A report on 
competitiveness commissioned by the European Commission concluded that “the diffusion of 
cost-effective ways of dispensing drugs could be encouraged, relying on mail-order pharmacies 
and on the potential gains in productivity that are associated with the new Information and 
Communication Technologies” (Gambardella, Orsenigo and Pammolli, 2000, 61). The sector is 
almost undeveloped in Europe, however, because only three countries (Denmark, Netherlands 
and the UK) allow distance selling of medicines. Furthermore, the pioneer online pharmacies 
established in these countries are in theory allowed to sell to buyers from other countries of the 
EU by the e-commerce directive (Bordoni, 2001, 2). National authorities are increasingly 
constraining such practice, however, as shown by the DocMorris.com case (Zwick, 2001).21 
Meanwhile, the EU is busy devising grand plans and implementing costly infrastructures of 
doubtful value, such as the “eEurope An Information Society for All” initiative (European 
Commission, 1999, 14; 2001). In summary, it seems that European governments are striving to 
facilitate e-commerce by all means except, in the case of e-pharmacy, for removing the 
regulatory constraints that make it still impossible in most of the EU.  
VI. Conveyancers 
Intervention by various kinds of lawyers is legally required to contract real estate in many 
countries. In other cases, including 16 states in the USA, there is no legal requirement but 
lawyers are the only professionals allowed to help in writing such contracts. Notaries enjoy a 
similar monopoly all over Europe, with the exceptions of Ireland, the UK and Scandinavia but 
including former Socialist countries, as well as in Latin America. Their position is grounded on 
the legal requirement of notarisation to file all sorts of documents in public registers and is 
protected by a full set of restrictions, including a closed number of notaries, fixed prices and 
prohibitions on advertising and organization of notary offices.  
Various international initiatives have recently argued that mandatory intervention by civil 
law notaries is inefficient. In its Doing Business 2004, the World Bank suggested that notaries 
are the main culprits for the greater cost and longer duration of company incorporations in civil 
law countries (World Bank, 2004, pp. 26-27). Together with pharmacies, notaries figured 
prominently as the most regulated profession in the study commissioned by the European Union 
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Competition DG on the liberalization of professions (Monti, 2003, 2; Paterson, Fink, and Ogus, 
2003, pp. 51-57).  
Both initiatives made a good case but also forgot two key points. By focusing on notaries, 
the Doing Business report disregards the fact that a similar argument can be made about lawyers 
when their intervention is still de iure or de facto mandatory. By paying insufficient attention to 
the nature of the service in question, the EU risks advancing costly reforms that might perpetuate 
many of the current inefficiencies, as shown by the mixed results of liberalization efforts. For 
instance, the Netherlands liberalized most notaries’ prices since 1999 and allowed some freedom 
of entry into each other’s reserved markets, but results have been poor (Kuijpers, Noailly and 
Vollaard, 2005; and Nahuis and Noailly, 2005).  
Instead of partial liberalizations, of dubious effects, what is needed is to adapt public policy 
to current circumstances. The starting point is to evaluate under which titling systems and for 
which transactions mandatory intervention is still necessary. The demand for conveyancing 
services has changed substantially with the development of land titling systems and the radical 
transformations that have taken place in the parties, technology and transactions of the 
conveyancing market. Such changes in both institutions and markets have made intervention by 
law professionals less necessary, especially in standard residential transactions. Let us briefly 
explain why.22 
At the institutional level, states have developed titling systems which effectively make 
property contracts or property rights public, reducing the threat that hidden property rights 
previously posed to acquirers. This destroyed most of the demand for those conveyancing 
services that, to some extent, provided a substitutive service, avoiding title conflicts, designing 
title guarantees and acting as title depositories. Public titling systems made these services 
unnecessary with respect to rights held by third parties. Recording of deeds made lawyers and 
notaries redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced their demand for designing title 
guarantees. And registration of rights fundamentally modifies their role in gathering the consent 
of affected third parties: given that under registration, courts adjudicate conflicting rights by 
applying a rule of liability (Arruñada, 2003), parties tend to encourage conveyancers and title 
examiners to disguising before the register instead of preventing such title conflicts, a change 
that further reduces the former gatekeeping function of these professionals. More recently, 
information technologies are competing with notaries as document authenticators.  
At the market level, the emergence of large firms in mortgage lending, real estate 
development and mediation of property transactions has reduced the comparative advantage of 
conveyancers because such firms are in a good position to guarantee quality to their customers 
and to reach economies of scale and lower costs in the preparation of contracts. A similar 
consequence has resulted from changes in the nature of transactions, which have become more 
standardized with the development of mass markets and mandatory legislation, both of which 
reduce the demand for tailoring contracts to individual needs.  
In sum, public titling systems have made qualified conveyancers less useful with respect to 
rights held by third parties. At the same time, large, reputable parties and standardized 
transactions have made such professional conveyancing less necessary and effective for 
protecting parties to private contracts against each other. Mandatory intervention by law 
                                                 
22 This is based on Arruñada (2003). 18 
professionals should therefore be reconsidered, especially for standard contracts. Alternative 
procedures for entering individual contracts and other standard documents in land and company 
registers should be established. These should include steps for checking parties’ identities and 
capacities more effectively and should cover the use of electronic documents. The State may also 
play a greater role in drawing up standard-form default contracts for real estate conveyance, 
mortgage loans and company registration.  
Recent reforms and trends are moving in this direction, with lawyers being used only in 
transactions in which they are really needed. In most of the US, lawyers do not intervene in most 
residential transactions and mortgages, and title companies, through lay employees, search the 
title, prepare the documents and close the transaction. These tasks have also been performed in 
England by licensed conveyancers since 1986. The fact that the US uses recording of deeds and 
England registration of rights suggests that these changes are viable under both systems of public 
titling.  
VII.  Conclusion 
Professional services are characterized by information asymmetries, economies of scope and 
externalities. To resolve conflicts of interest, they require special organizational formulas, based 
on deferred and variable compensation, self-selection and, when positive externalities are 
necessary, competitive restraints. In principle, a set of criteria and organizational design patterns 
could be used for assessing, managing and regulating all types of professional organization, 
whether public or private, competitive or monopolistic. Competitive restraints, however, entail 
substantial risks, one of the main ones being that they tend to outlast their useful life. This point 
has been illustrated here by examining pharmacists and conveyancers, two professions for which 
the existing restraints may today be dysfunctional to the extent that the services that might have 
made such restraints necessary are provided by other public and private agents. Greater 
liberalization is therefore advisable, especially for standard services, and not only from a public 
interest perspective but also from the private interest perspective of the professions themselves. 
If my argument is correct, liberalization would encourage professionals to quit providing trivial 
services and focus on those which make efficient use of professionals’ knowledge and add 
greater value to users, what nowadays seems to be the only sustainable strategy in a dynamic 
society. 19 
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